Paradoxes of Happiness.

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There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.

Oscar Wilde

ABSTRACT
The quest for the secret of happiness yields confusions, antinomies and paradoxes, shadowed in the theological hope of another life. Beyond semantics, the paradoxes stem from systematic traps, such as the cult of positional goods, as well as from deeper logical aspects of the relation of desire to satisfaction. Most fundamentally their roots lie in certain features of the brain, more closely tied to individual personality than to life's events. So character, it seems, is destiny, and destiny hangs on the grace of brain chemistry.
Paradoxes of Happiness

0. Prospect

We are often told that happiness lies in living according to nature. Yet as the depressed most lucidly sees, nature is a sinister business. No other life, elsewhere, will compensate us; yet phenomenology and biology echo the theological evasion that happiness is elsewhere. The quest for the secret of happiness yields confusions, antinomies and paradoxes, both in theory and in practice. I want to sample some of these and understand their cause. Confusions result from semantics: we learn language individually, yet assume it applies universally. Beyond semantics, paradoxes stem from systematic mistakes, some superficial, such as the cult of positional goods, some deeper, concerning the relation of desire to satisfaction. More fundamental still are three features of the brain: the disconnection of motivation, pleasure, and desire; the odd algorithm by which past pleasures and pains are computed in present memory; and the dependence of all the brains's mechanisms on chemical processes. These features of our brains are more closely tied to individual personality than to life's events. So character, it seems, is destiny, and destiny hangs on chemical grace. While these are all natural facts, the familiar injunction to Follow Nature is unlikely to be helpful. Happiness and depression are evolutionary side-effects of brain mechanisms designed, with no thought for our welfare, by the profoundly alien agents that are our genes. The paradoxes generated by the pursuit of happiness suggests that unhappiness might best be mitigated by chemical intervention with the mechanisms of the brain.

1. The vice grip of theodicy

Many years ago, a Mississippi State trooper in charge of processing my car registration asked me, apparently in the line of duty, whether I believed in God. Upon hearing that I did not, he quietly said: "That sends shivers down my spine. No man can bear the burdens of this life alone." The germ of all of theology, and of my message here, was in that State trooper's cri du coeur.

I am a philosophical manic-depressive. As a philosopher, I want to see the world as it really is.
I also believe that I see things more clearly and truly when I am depressed. To back me on this, there's some empirical evidence that depressed people are more realistic. More recent research, however, has found that even depressed people are quite unrealistic, which is depressing in itself.¹ So I may not myself be being realistic about this, but at least I'm consistent: When I’m depressed, I say: Good! Now I see things as they are! and in celebrating the new clarity of my vision I become elated. Which of course depresses me. And so on.

It follows that happiness cannot be pursued. For insofar as I pursue the clarity of depression, I necessarily expose myself to the mist of elation. The pursuit is therefore self-defeating. I shall argue that this is no mere idiosyncrasy of the philosophical manic-depressive. There are other interesting obstacles to the pursuit of happiness.

Whatever else may be said about manic-depression, it is dynamic. To catch it on the wing and hold it, the discipline of theodicy was invented. Theodicy is frozen manic-depression: it turns the depression and the mania into the two arms of a vice grip in which the hapless believer is caught. One arm of the vice grip is expressed in the message of Hopkins's Leaden Echo: *wisdom is early to despair*². It requires us to be imbued with the full horror of life. That is best induced by meditating on history. But don't just focus on wars and revolutions and Man's Inhumanity to Man. Forget about mammalian iniquities altogether. Our time has been short. Contemplate the

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¹ The empirical research I cite focuses on “realism” in trivial judgments. (Alloy and Abramson 1979); (Dunning and Story 1991); (Carson 2001). For a compelling and more existential meditation on whether and how one sees more clearly in a true state of depression, see (Jonathan Dollimore 2001).

² Hopkins: THE LEADEN ECHO
... And wisdom is early to despair:
Be beginning; since, no, nothing can be done
To keep at bay Age and age’s evils, hoar hair,
Ruck and wrinkle, drooping, dying, death’s worst, winding sheets, tombs and worms and tumbling to decay;
So be beginning, be beginning to despair......
THE GOLDEN ECHO
Spare! There is one, yes I have one (Hush there!); Only not within seeing of the sun,
Not within the singeing of the strong sun,
Tall sun’s tingeing, or treacherous the tainting of the earth’s air,
Somewhere elsewhere....
billions of years before that, populated by creatures bent on tearing one another limb from limb. According to Michel Cabanac (1999) the capacity for conscious feeling arose in phylogeny somewhere between the amphibians and the reptiles. The lizards can feel. The fish and the frogs just react. Perhaps the dinosaurs were the original Cartesian animal-machines and took it all in stride. But either way, if you believe in God, you'd better be an all-out Young-Earth-Creationist. For what could God have been doing just watching this senseless carnage for billions of years?¹

So let the gloom settle in nicely, and whisper "wisdom is early to despair". That's when the other arm of the vice grip closes in, by slipping in the echo: "Spare! yes there is one, yes I know one...." One what? One saving trick. A simple disappearing trick, actually: declare the whole thing—life as we know it—void. Real life is elsewhere. Nature red in tooth and claw doesn't count. It will all be made up to you, and, I suppose, to every sensate lizard. Happiness is elsewhere, in another world, and only that other is truly real.

Thus one is caught in the vice grip of theodicy: On one side, life is awful. But on the other, consolation is rooted in the very awfulness of life. For since it is indeed too awful to be true, it can't be true. And so it isn't, as we will see once we realize that this isn't real life after all. The rest is theological details, over which believers are wont to slaughter one another, but which needn't concern us here.

Once transmuted from theology into phenomenology and biology, this scheme holds the key to the elusiveness of happiness. Many accidents contribute to this elusiveness—but it is also part of the very essence of happiness, which is to be elsewhere, in ways I shall attempt to elucidate.

2. What is 'Happiness'?

¹ Don't object that I'm presuming to speculate about the mind of God: of course I am, and so does any theology, even the purest via negativa. If you didn't presume that, you couldn't be in business as a theologian. Witness Descartes in one breath telling us we can't second guess God's motives, and in the next doing just that: explaining that God couldn't be motivated to deceive, or that he may like to watch us make mistakes for the sake of variety. (See Descartes, Med. IV)
Let me begin with words. Word meanings are no more determined in heaven than happiness itself. They arise pell-mell as each person's idiolect gets constructed through childhood and beyond, out of the random jostlings of utterances, situations, and interpretations. As a result, the consensus about the semantic structure of our vocabulary is only approximate. Storm, Jones and Storm (1996) looked for confirmation that 'happiness' is a superordinate word in a hierarchical family. They took sixteen words related to happiness: Ecstasy, Bliss, Elation, Joy, Merriment, Cheerfulness, Serenity, Peacefulness, Amusement, Jubilation, Contentment, Satisfaction, Gladness, Hope, Pride, and Triumph, and asked of each whether it was happiness or whether happiness was it. We philosophers are brought up to believe in entailment: if Paul is a bachelor, that entails he is not married. But for linguists and psychologists things aren't so cut-and-dried. Subjects got four choices from "Certainly No" to "Certainly Yes". (Storm et al. 294) The results tended to confirm that happiness is a more general term than any of the other sixteen, but for my purposes they form, to put it as technically as I can, an interesting mess. Among other things they suggest that bliss and cheerfulness each entail happiness, though if you're happy you are more likely to be cheerful than blissful. If contented it's quite likely that you're happy; less so if you are serene; but if you are serene you're not as likely to be happy as if you are content. Joy, merriment, cheerfulness and gladness seem to come closest to being synonymous with happiness, since over 80% of respondents found entailments going both ways. (See Table 1)4

Most notable, however, is the idiosyncrasy of people's conceptions of happiness that underlies these less than firm results. The variability in different people's conditions of happiness is easy to see. Some have counted themselves happy who were poor, or sick, or desperately neurotic ("I've had a wonderful life", said Wittgenstein). Religious faith is often cited as enhancing well-being. And indeed I dare say Mohammed Atta was a happy man at the last, fulfilled, going to God's bosom, like Joan of Arc, in a blaze. But so was atheist Hume a happy man, so shockingly serene even on his deathbed that his devout friend Boswell had to rush to a brothel, where no doubt he

4 [All tables and figures are at the end]
asked for the Afterlife Special. Aristotle summed it up first: "Some say one thing and some another, indeed very often the same man says different things at different times: when he falls sick he thinks health is happiness, when he is poor, wealth." (NE I-5 trans. Rackham)

In that sentence Aristotle suggests two ideas to be explored. The first is a version of what I've suggested already: our idea of happiness shifts according to circumstance, following, like a sort of perverse sunflower, the dark spot of whatever we currently lack. Wherever we may be, happiness is elsewhere. The second idea is in potential tension with the first. It is that happiness depends not on your circumstances, but on who you are. It is in tension with the other, because it suggests that the same lack may be experienced differently by two different individuals. Taken to its extreme, this is the Heraclitean idea that character is fate. It matters little what happens: your level of happiness is predestined in your genes and early learning. More on this later.

3. Why most prescriptions are more lucrative than effective

Whether because happiness is predestined or merely because it needs to be individually tailored, most prescriptions for happiness are more lucrative than effective. The same was true until quite recently for medical prescriptions (Thomas 1975), and it continues to be true for "traditional" medicine. There are three main reasons both sorts of prescription still sell briskly. First, the placebo effect: advice from happiness experts, like traditional medicine, all find favour, because just thinking you are getting help will work, up to a point and for a while (Carroll 2003). The second reason is that regardless of whether it even seems to work, in desperation people will try anything. (Desperation, curiously, seems to be the opposite of despair: in true despair people will no longer try anything.) The third reason is the systematic attribution error well known as superstition, which consists in ascribing causal efficacy to circumstantial events in preference to chance and constant factors (Rudski, Lischner and Albert 1999).

Here's how it works for traditional medicine. (Fig. 1) Most diseases get worse in a first phase: fever rises and rashes and pains get more and more alarming. Then in a second phase they get
better. Anything you take during phase one will be credited with the improvements at phase two—unless you die, in which case you left it too late before seeking the advice of your alternative practitioner.

This promotes belief, because attention is focused on the cure, not the curve. *I know first hand that it works, because I've tried it myself and I got better!* says the patient who took the cure at point A.\(^5\) Much the same holds for courses of therapy that promise happiness. The clients assume happiness will spring from circumstance—getting married, getting a job or a new nose, or just taking the course. But what if these things hardly mattered at all?

Before I get to that, consider three puzzles intended to illustrate, and begin to diagnose, the confusion at the heart of our notion of happiness.

4. Three Symptomatic Puzzles

(i). Is it better to be smart or dumb?

The first puzzle is inspired by Aristotle's characterization of happiness as "activity in accordance with your characteristic excellence." (NE x-6) By elimination, on the basis of a few additional constraints, he went on to specify that this consisted in contemplation. But contemplation, as those who profess it know all too well, is not everyone's cup of tea. Hence the old question: is it better to be Socrates dissatisfied or a pig satisfied?

On whether intelligence is actually correlated with well-being, empirical research is equivocal. (Diener et al. 1999). As philosophers, we get to regiment this equivocation into an antinomy:

**Thesis:** *Smart people have more fun.* This is surely plausible, because smart people find

\(^5\) Gilbert Harman (1999) has argued that the notion of individual character manifests the "Fundamental Attribution Error", which seems to work in reverse where human agency is concerned. People attribute to the character of the agent what is actually determined by ambient circumstances. The two errors seem contrary, but may not be if the patient is viewed as crediting the practitioner's personal skills, as opposed to the vagaries of chance and circumstances that would have prevailed without her intervention.
more ways to amuse themselves in the absence of television, if only by finding entertainment in the contents of their own mind. But on the other hand,

**Antithesis** *You have to be dumb to be happy.* Else you would realize how grim things really are.

Aside from the fact that the antithesis fails to allow for the Philo-Manic-Depressive, both sides of the antinomy are questionable. The thesis rests on the assumption that repetition is boring and boredom incompatible with happiness. That ties in Aristotle's view, as well as his definition of pleasure as "natural activity unimpeded" (*NE* VII-12). But it neglects the cultivation of a kind of meditative boredom which is sometimes advocated as a means to serenity—and serenity, as we saw in Table 1, is 55% of happiness. Still, insofar as dispelling boredom makes for happiness, it is likely that what underlies the rewards afforded by Aristotelian activity is the biological role of *play*. Play hones essential skills. So natural selection must have made it rewarding. And the brain, too, likes to play, and that is what explains the pleasure we get from exercising the modules that serve to construct for us coherent representations of the world. (Fig 2).

Pleasures taken in movies that evoke horror, love or sex doubtless owe their appeal to the same basic mechanism, though they tickle different modules. Not incidentally, all of these pleasures taken in the exercise of our faculties illustrate Aristotle's characterization, at the level not of behaviour but of neural activity.

On the other hand, there is no reason you have to be especially smart to exercise these brain modules. The antithesis is therefore dubious as well as self-righteous. It might even seem offensive, not so much in the slur on duller wits, but in that implied against those pathologically cheerful temperaments who are unable to feel as dejected as their knowledge of the world would

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6 Aristotle explicitly denied that happiness lies in entertainment. But play, as I understand it, is not entertainment even when it is entertaining.
enjoin.7 However that may be, the crucial point is that emotions require more than opinions. Understanding no more ensures gloom than the lack of it guarantees cheerfulness.

The lesson here is this. When we look at the biological story that underlies Aristotle's characterization, the antinomy disappears. Such a shift of focus, bringing to light the biology behind the perplexities of phenomenology, is what I am advocating in this essay.

(ii) Hot pursuit

I return now to the paradox of pursuit. Americans have a constitutional right to pursue happiness. Many exercise this right with grim determination. Yet it's a familiar cliché that the pursuit of happiness undermines itself. Why should this be? I see two quite different causes. One may seem more superficial in that it appears to stem from ideology; the other comes from the logic of the concept of happiness. But both, I contend, also have deeper roots.

The ideological cause is that chief among the benefits for the sake of which people vainly place their hope in wealth, are what economists call "positional goods." It's not the things you have that are valued, it's the having more of them than others. But the pursuit of positional goods inevitably leads to a Prisoner's Dilemma8: since what matters is not what I have, but the comparison between what I have and what you have, we're bound to expend more in their pursuit than their mere possession would warrant. This must, by the logic of the situation, leave us all much in the same relative position as we started in—hence worse off overall, when effort and aggravation are counted in.9

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7 Perhaps its plausibility rests on a confusion between stupidity and ignorance, which is, after all, reputed to be bliss (which we saw to be 97% happiness, though happiness is only 61% bliss.)

8 In the structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), prisoners are expendable. It can be illustrated as follows. At a club dinner, the diners agree that each will pay an equal share of the wine bill regardless of how much they have consumed. Each diner reasons that if she drinks more than the average, she will have bought her wine more cheaply. As a result, each has reason to drink more than her fellow diners. All end up drunker and poorer, and each is worse off than she would have been, had she not been rationally self-interested. A vast number of human situations involving groups of individuals rationally pursuing their interests exhibit this structure, fostering a "race to the bottom" which leaves all worse off.

9 See (Heath and Potter forthcoming).
Now if something could be given away without the giver being deprived of it, you'd expect that sort of thing to escape being hoarded for positional advantage. And indeed there is such a class of goods, namely ideas. Yet Americans' devotion to positional goods is so deeply ingrained that they have hemmed in even ideas with legal barbed wire so as to nullify their peculiar virtue. Now ideas too have become positional goods. As a result, the scholar and scientist are dispossessed of their chief jewels—joyful contemplation and discovery—by the anxieties of priority and greed. Did I have this idea first? Shouldn't you pay me if you want to repeat it?

So much for the ideological reason. Perhaps we could overcome it if we decided to be nicer; but that may be harder than it seems, for the importance of positional goods may be more primate trait than American quirk (de Waal 1998).

Even if we could forswear positional goods, however, the logical difficulty would remain. To see why, recall the messy results obtained by Storm et al. They seem to have assumed that Merriment, Cheerfulness, Serenity, etc. are species or perhaps better determinates of happiness. That would justify talk of a hierarchy (though it would still be rather short on the archy, as genera don't control their species). But merriment, cheerfulness and so on are not species or even determinates of happiness, any more than the various objects at which I might shoot an arrow are determinates or species of the genus 'target'. The lower terms designate not species of happiness but ways of being happy. They constitute the actual intentional object of enjoyment when one is happy, or the intentional objects of desire when one aspires to happiness.

To see this, consider a symmetry between happiness and money. Happiness is the paradigm case

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10 The same has been said of love, to be sure, but the maths here may be more chaotic. In the case of ideas, or more generally of anything that can be regarded as information in the technical sense, the arithmetic is strict and simple: my sharing an idea with you may involve a small energy cost, but the cost is uncorrelated with the importance of the idea, and not one byte of information is lost to me by the conveyance.

11 A species instantiates a generic property plus another which is its differentia. By contrast, while a determinate also instantiates the property of its determinable, no differentia can be specified. The relation of determinable to determinate is best modeled by relations of colour: we say loosely that crimson is a kind of red, but it is a determinate, not a species, since no differentiae can serve to specify the different "kinds" of reds there are.
of what is intrinsically desirable. Money is the paradigm of what is desirable only instrumentally. Yet each in its way is contentless.

] Money can be pursued in itself, but cannot be desired in itself.
] Happiness is desired for itself, but cannot be pursued in itself.
] When I want money, I want it for something else. I may not know yet what that is, but the money will be useless until I do. Money in itself has no desirable content.
] When I want happiness, there must be something else I want for it. I may not yet know what it is—merriment, serenity, success, adulation, or love—but I can't set out on the pursuit until I do. Happiness in itself has no pursuable content. Again, in relation to what we pursue, happiness is always elsewhere.

It follows that happiness may be among those things that can be pursued only by indirection, like sleep, or love. You can't find love intentionally any more than you can go to sleep intentionally, though you can put yourself in the way of it, as by counting sheep.¹²

In the light of this perhaps I should invert my opening paradox. It's not exactly that you can't pursue happiness, it's rather that you can't fail to do so. But in the end these come to the same: If a target is defined as whatever you are aiming at, the advice to aim at the target is unhelpful.

(iii). Leaving something to be desired

When we say, The situation leaves something to be desired, we mean we're not quite happy. But what if there were literally nothing to desire? That sounds like a coma more than like happiness. In happiness, does one not at least desire that the present state endure? So if there were really nothing to be desired you wouldn't be happy either.

Yet Buddhists are said to recommend the elimination of desire, on the ground that all suffering is linked to desire. And so it is, if only because suffering engenders a desire that it cease. But that is

¹² Which is reputed to put you in the way of happiness too, if you can get to Arcadia.
the wrong sort of link. The point isn't supposed to be that suffering creates desire, but that desire leads to suffering. On the other hand, many a joy is also linked to desire, so renouncing desire will deprive us of those joys.

The trick is to find a kind of joy that isn't linked to desire. Many traditions prescribe spiritual joys. But for two reasons that is no solution. First, because spiritual joys can be objects of desire. Mystics, artists and intellectuals are all well acquainted with yearning. Secondly, some bodily pleasures require no conscious desire: as even Plato noticed, we can be unexpectedly delighted by the smell of roses as we enter a garden.

This second objection looks feebler on second thought. For it assumes desire exists only when conscious. But there are reasons to think the desire for sweet smells is better construed as permanent and innate, even if it is only occasionally conscious. (Schroeder forthcoming). All the more reason to view the absence of desire as incompatible with any sort of mental life at all. If happiness is not elsewhere, nestled in some object of desire, then it is nowhere at all.

5. Vice, grace, and chemistry

Let us look further into the relation of desire to happiness. To the puzzles just discussed, as well as to those I'll come to in the next section, I will suggest an explanation in terms of the disconnection between desire, motivation and pleasure.

That $p$ should come true when you wanted $p$ is no warrant of satisfaction. Your desire might have been insufficiently specific: I know I said an apple, but not that kind. Or it might be that kind, but it tastes different now than I remembered. You should have specified. But you can never fully specify what you want. The Monkey's Paw phenomenon always threatens: you wanted $p$ and $p$ came true, but so did all kinds of other horrible things that you didn't think of mentioning in your specifications.

13 From the W.W. Jacobs story of that name, in which the monkey's paw talisman always bring what you wish, but always in ways that may you long to undo it.
Conversely, happiness can arise without antecedent desire. What mystics call grace is a little like Plato's rose garden. Though grace can be desired, it cannot be brought on by the machinery of intention that typically follows on desire. But there is an element of grace, not only where joy comes unbidden, but in all those satisfied desires that manage to evade Oscar Wilde's second tragedy. Being lucky enough to get what you want is only the half of it. Enjoying what you wanted when you get it is the other. And that too takes luck: the right neurons must fire, neurotransmitters flow, circuits light up. Only they stand between you and the proverbial dust and ashes. That is what, translating theology into biology, I shall call chemical grace.

The chronic case of dust and ashes I propose to call vice. A vice is something you can no longer stop choosing to do although it no longer brings any pleasure. How can there be such a thing? If desire is more than mere wanting—for we can want to do what we have no desire to do—is not pleasure the proper object of desire, that which it tautologically pursues? If so, then how is it possible to desire what gives no pleasure? A smoker may desire to smoke, yet not enjoy it. To be sure, her desire might focus on relief from the pain of not smoking. In true addicts, perhaps the pain of withdrawal may seem to be the only source of the desire. But then we're back with the Buddhists: this isn't desire causing suffering, but suffering causing desire. If that is so, vice is not quite addiction. But it surely occurs. Sometimes one seeks not relief from suffering, but just the nicotine, the caffeine, the dopamine—yet gets no pleasure when it comes.

Here is a recent triumph of science: the creation of vice in rats. Berridge and Valenstein (1991) manipulated rats' brains in such a way as to produce a desire and motivation to eat, but were able to ascertain by the rats' physiological and expressive behaviour that while they wanted to eat, they did so without liking it. (For what the difference looks like, see Fig. 3).

The very possibility of vice in my sense, whether in rats or people, is paradoxical in the light of a certain common-sense picture of the intimate connection between desire, pleasure, and motivation. The view is roughly this:

] desire motivates us to pursue a goal,
successful pursuit secures the object of desire
attaining the object of our desire produces pleasure,
pleasure rewards the pursuit,
the reward increases the probability that the desire will recur.\textsuperscript{14}

But as Tim Schroeder (forthcoming)\textsuperscript{15} has shown in some detail, this picture conflicts both with phenomenology and neuroscience. Schroeder adduces an impressive amount of evidence and argument to show that of the "three faces of desire"—motivation, pleasure and reward—only the third is linked essentially to desire.\textsuperscript{16} As the facts already alluded to make clear, there can be motivation without desire, and pursuit without resulting pleasure. Because the learning induced by the reward system modifies the perceptual and association capacities as well as behavioral dispositions, some learning can occur without affecting motivation. Consequently, on this view of desire, desire's links to motivation and pleasure are causal ones: they hold in standard cases, but we should expect to find disconnections between them.

Hence the possibility of vice: not as a form of perversity stemming from the misuse of the divine gift of free-will, but merely as a consequence of a quirk in the engineering of our brains which we share with the humble rat.

6. Mixing memory and desire

Just as desire can fail to be matched with pleasure when attained, so memory can fail to record

\textsuperscript{14} The picture has a compelling logic, but apart from being wrong it has not always been regarded as benign. Its cyclic structure brings it very close to Plato's "leaky jar" conception of desire, as well as to the Buddhist cycle of suffering and desire. The most compelling poetic expression of it that I know is Baudelaire's \textit{Voyage}.

\textsuperscript{15} Most of what I refer to on the neurology of desire I have learned from this important forthcoming book. My account is highly simplified, particularly in one crucial respect: I have ignored the fact that neurologically as well as phenomenologically pleasure and displeasure are separate systems, not merely poles in a single continuum.

\textsuperscript{16} The most counterintuitive case is desire without motivation. Schroeder illustrates this with "akinetic mutism" a condition consequent on lesions of the motor Anterior Cingulate cortex and to Adjacent Supplementary motor area where "sufferers make no voluntary movements or vocalizations, not as a result of straightforward paralysis but because they can no longer initiate actions", yet we have no other reason to think they do not have desires, capable of promoting other forms of learning. [Schroeder p. 110]
past pleasure as happiness, and can view past pain as happy. This isn't a matter of subjective
experience disagreeing with some more "objective" test. For at both times the assessment is
made on the basis of experienced feeling. Many people, for example, deem that happiness is
linked to satisfying work, which often isn’t describable as bringing pleasure. Sometimes when
we are working at an activity that engages us, we would describe ourselves as enjoying it. At
other times the effort of work is experienced as anguish at the time, yet it appears as happiness in
retrospect.

Why should this be? Part of the explanation may lie in a quirk called the "peak-end rule"
discovered by David Kahneman and others. (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, et al. 1993). In
measuring the overall pleasantness of a past period consisting of a sequence of shorter episodes,
we reckon in only two of the component episodes: the one with the most extreme valence,
whatever its place in the sequence, and the last, whatever its rating. So a largely unpleasant
period may not be viewed as such if it ended pleasantly. If *finishing* the work is pleasant, this
could explain why we can look back on a long period of painful work as happy.

One could speculate about the evolutionary origins of the Peak-End mechanism. Maybe it was
selected for the advantage it confers in certain crucial situations, and then applied to all
assessments of the past. Without the notorious capacity of women to ignore the pain of childbirth
in retrospect, for example, a One Child Policy would have triumphed prematurely. Or maybe it's
just a piece of lazy design like so many others in nature: accurate integration of past pleasures
and pains was just never worth the engineering cost.

Assuming then that happiness has something to do with how we feel, and indeed often with our
capacity to *live in the present*, what are we to say about the prospect that present experience will
get reassessed by future judgment? Conversely, why should I trust a present judgment about the
past which doesn't match the assessment I made at the time? Which matters more? Is it what I
experience *right now*, or is it what I will experience in retrospect, as I judge this moment in the
calm contemplation of what my life was like?
I have no answer. What is certain is this. When you consider that in most people’s lives the last moments are among the worst, the finding that only the end counts is a dismal finding indeed. Chalk up an additional squeeze to the theological vice grip.

7. Character is Destiny

Let me return now to the Heraclitean strand I twice left dangling: the paradoxical fact that happiness sticks closer to the person than to events. I noted that when we seek happiness, happiness isn't generally the intentional object of our quest. Yet what we do pursue or avoid—"bottom-up" factors such as money, marriage, jobs, accidents that leave you quadriplegic—turn out to make remarkably little difference to our sense of well-being (Diener et al. 1999).

Start with money. If our conduct reflects our beliefs, the cliché that money doesn't make happiness is one most of us don't really believe. So we might expect that money at least affects our sense of subjective well-being, though it might give rise to illusions of happiness. And yet the evidence is clear enough. Lottery winners, it is said, are often more miserable than they were before. This can be attributed to the various pitfalls that attend the satisfaction of desire, not to mention the excess of new friends. But the effects either way don't seem to last. It's no different if your income steadily increases. (Fig 4).

More generally Diener reports that according to some studies such "bottom-up" factors could only account for 8% to 15% of the variance in reports of subjective well-being. (Diener et al 1999, p. 278-9) The one factor that seems decisive is personality, some 80% of which is heritable. On the basis of this, Diener comments, "it could be said that it is as hard to change one's happiness as it is to change one's height." (Diener et al. 1999, p. 279).

Furthermore, even when bottom-up events do affect our well-being, they may themselves result from our personalities. Insofar as that is true, Heraclitus's dictum that character is fate is true

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17 Diener et al (1999) again:
twice over. First, it pretty much dictates whether we are happy, regardless of what happens. Then, for the 8% to 15% of the rest that is caused by the vicissitudes of life, character shapes some of those too. And even if some of the latter stem from perception rather than reality, the characteristics that influence how life is perceived are themselves features of personality.

How is a philosophical manic-depressive supposed to feel about that? If happiness is something you were born with, no more changeable than your height, that's one more reason to give up on its pursuit. Note that not everyone finds that reason compelling, since the Puritans, for one, believed in predestination and yet furiously persisted in the pursuit of salvation. Surely that was irrational, but then that's for theologians to determine.

On the other hand, there is something you can do about even your height: elevator shoes. Those surely have their equivalent in mood-elevating drugs. Aldous Huxley's soma is not quite here yet, but it's coming, and if it can work for you without too many awkward side-effects, then I'm all for it. Just as Mill advocated a judicious alternation of excitement and tranquillity over time, so the philosophical manic-depressive might be willing to settle for a judicious mix of clear-headed gloom and cheerful illusion, carefully controlled by direct intervention on the neurotransmitters.

8. Fools' Paradise, Natural and Artificial

Drugs! you say. Heaven help us! You are advocating drugs! But isn't a chemical happiness the very type of illusory happiness? Won't all the wise men and women from antiquity to the present rise up and swear in the witness-box of culture that happiness is not to be found in artificial paradises?

Against this, it's tempting to respond much as the painter did to the bishop. Shocked to see that

"Another challenging factor is that genetic effects on SWB may not be direct. For example, (Plomin, Lichtenstein, Pedersen, et al. 1990) found that genes have an influence on life events. In other words, there are genetic factors influencing behavior that increase the probability that certain life events will be experienced. (p. 279)
he'd given the angels shoes, the bishop challenged: "Have you ever seen an angel wearing shoes?" and the painter answered: "Have you ever seen an angel go barefoot?" So to the challenge about artificial paradises, I say: have you ever seen a natural paradise?

Yes! they will say, Mengzi, Laozi, Aristotle, Spinoza and the other assorted Greens: Nature is the answer. It is not true that happiness is elsewhere: it is inside you, in your garden if you can afford one, providing you let Nature be your guide.

But the Follow Nature movement is squarely rooted in bad faith. For each one of us is the product of nature as surely as are eagles, antelopes, and the smallpox virus. Acting and making is what we do, just as the flowers grow. And so what we make is a product of nature too: like birds' bowers or the dams that beavers build, genetically modified foods and greenhouse gases are just products of nature at one remove. If it is not permissible to drive the Bald Eagle to extinction, why is it all right to eradicate smallpox? Because we find eagles nice and smallpox nasty. Talk of nature is always a smokescreen for choices not of natural things but among them.

The counsel to follow nature worked for Aristotle because he had a neat two-stage method for implementing it: first, discover empirically what the function of human life is. Next, fulfill that function. Action was at one with being. The main problem lies at the first stage. We can't read off teleology from the facts: things don't always act in accordance with their natural ends even if we grant that they have them. (Besides, our natural end is death: a fact which Aristotle fudges, lacking the theological vice grip.) So we can't look to what's happening and expect to find what's meant to happen.

We can, it is true, look to the past: Millikan's Methods do yield a robust distinction between what happens and what's supposed to happen: viz., roughly, that it's supposed to happen if its happening earlier up in the lineage causally enabled its capacity to happen now (Millikan 1984; Millikan 1993). Unlike some critics of Millikan I think it's no drawback of her theory of function that we have to look to the past to figure out what counts as a function and what doesn't. But a
much more serious problem looms. Being a function by that criterion, unlike being a function as Aristotle thought of them, carries no warrant of value for me now. What is it to me that some trait was adaptive for my ancestors in the past? Why should that make it an end for me?

The infection of this worry spreads to those ends that I do think my own. From a biological perspective, the very fact that I value something for its own sake results from a stealthy manipulations of an agency alien to me. The aims of those aliens are best furthered by my blindly following what I think of as my own goals. In the theological version, we are instruments in the hands of God, whose "higher" purposes we serve even without discerning them. In that light, revolt seems no less reasonable than submission. In biological terms, the intrinsic value of happiness is just a manipulative trick by our genes, to get us to do what they metaphorically purpose. We are all puppets of our alien genes.

But not just of our genes, of course. There is evidence that intrinsic desires are not necessarily unconditioned. (Johnsrude, Owen, Zhao, et al. 1999), making way for the most insidious form of the tyranny of the social. If so, then depending on the way we have been conditioned, our intrinsic goals might clash regardless of whether they embody values incommensurable in the metaphysical space of values. They may clash simply as a result of the way we have been conditioned to want one thing, which may or may not satisfy us, as well as another incompatible thing. The case of manipulation by genes and the case of manipulation by conditioning seem to me equally disconcerting.

It is hard to take stock of the essential contingency of our desires and of our loves. It begins at birth. The child is doomed to love its parents, like Titania under Oberon's spell: you pop out, and

\[
Be \ it \ ounce, \ or \ cat, \ or \ bear, \\
Pard, \ or \ boar \ with \ bristled \ hair, \\
In \ thy \ eye \ that \ shall \ appear \\
When \ thou \ wakest, \ it \ is \ thy \ dear.
\]
Don't mistake me here: I'm not claiming that it's not a good thing that babies automatically love their parents. But good things of this sort are always general. Like many products of natural selection, they are good things statistically, which means they may turn out bad in particular. I'm just pointing out something that is hard to see because that a child's love seems so, well, natural: namely that while it creates intrinsic desires it isn't linked to individual interests and prior desires of the individuals concerned. Not because the infants don't have prior desires: they do, but those desires—for security, warmth, and so on—may be mightily frustrated in the future when their chemically fated love falls on unworthy objects. Once again, individual happiness is at odds with its own biological sources.

Well, the familiar counsel goes, you might as well go along with Nature because you have to. You'll feel better if you don't resist. That may be true for some; but others' nature may be such that they feel better, on the contrary, when they fight back. "Nature," said Katherine Hepburn to Humphrey Bogart in African Queen, "is what we were put in the world to rise above." That too, conforms to nature.

9. Summary and Conclusion

I have tried to re-tool in a biological mode what I called the vice-grip of theodicy, with its conviction that something outside of life must compensate for the ills of living. I sketched four ways in which that view may be seen as a dim reflection of some fundamental logical and biological facts about happiness, in its relation to desire, to pleasure, and to satisfaction:

First, I argued for what I called the contentless character of happiness, from which it follows that happiness can be desired for itself but cannot pursued in itself.

Secondly, I described how some paradoxes about desire and happiness might be explained by the

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18 Cf (Fodor 1999): "A concern to propagate one's genes would rationalize one's acting to promote one's children's welfare; but so too would an interest in one's children's welfare. Not all of one's motives could be instrumental, after all; there must be some things that one cares for just for their own sakes. Why, indeed, mightn't there be quite a few such things? Why shouldn't one's children be among them?"
disconnection, at the biological level, of pleasure and satisfaction from desire. This disconnection follows from Schroeder's view that the core nature of desire links it essentially to the reward system that results in changes in our perception, in our propensity to form new thoughts, and in our capacities and dispositions to behaviour.

Thirdly, I stressed the more general fact that the ultimate determinants of our happiness, both at the level of momentary satisfaction and of long-term well-being, are not life events but personality characteristics, which in turn are tied to the chemistry of the brain.

And fourthly, in response to the plausible idea that the secret of happiness lies in the injunction to live according to nature, I stressed the alien character of the biological determinants of what are experienced by us as intrinsic desires.

Finally, I suggested that when viewed from a biological point of view, even our intrinsic ends appear as instruments of an alien agency, and in that light I argued that we take a favourable view of technology that might allow us directly to affect the chemistry of the brain.

The approach I have favoured does not solve the intellectual problem of evil, for that problem is manufactured by theology in the first place. In the biological mode, there is no intellectual problem of evil. Yet my view remains a pessimistic one, because using chemical agents as they are made or discovered will never remove the essential alienness which, I have argued, marks nature's determination of our ends, as well as of our capacity to find emotional satisfaction in their achievement. As to the practical problem of what to pursue, I do not minimize the wisdom of common sense and ancient advice: be neither too rich nor too poor, pursue unimpeded activity in accordance with your nature, go jogging, and so forth. But I also mean seriously the suggestion that we should welcome chemical agents to lighten our darker moments and add colour to the brighter ones.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} Thanks are due to Nina Straus for incisive comments on an even more confused earlier draft
References


Table 1 (from Storm et al.)

Entailment: Mean Ratings, Standard Deviations, and Percentages of Yes Responses for Items Worded "If . . . ."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>Does X Entail Happiness?</th>
<th>Does Happiness Entail X?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (^a)</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>3.55*</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bliss</td>
<td>3.52*</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elation</td>
<td>3.61*</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>3.77*</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merriment</td>
<td>3.52*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cheerfulness</td>
<td>3.78*</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serenity</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacefulness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amusement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jubilation</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentment</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gladness</td>
<td>3.36*</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>1.89**</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>3.23*</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triumph</td>
<td>3.26*</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) 1 = certainly No; 4 = certainly Yes; n.s. = not significant.

* Mean rating significantly greater than 2.5 by one-sample t-test.

** Mean rating significantly less than 2.5 by one-sample t-test.
Most diseases get worse for a while, then better. When your patient comes in, s/he might be at A, or B. (If she dies, tell her she should have come in sooner.)
Fig. 2 The visual integration module

When we discern the face (left) or the dog (right), a pleasurable "Aha!" experience results.
Fig 3. How to tell if a rat is having a good time

Affective reactions to taste. (Hedonic reactions [top] are elicited by sucrose and other palatable tastes. Hedonic reactions include rhythmic midline tongue protrusion, nonrhythmic lateral tongue protrusion, and paw lick. Aversive reactions [bottom] are elicited by quinine and other nonpalatable tastes. Aversive reactions include gape, head shake, face wash, and forelimb flail. (Berridge and Valenstein 1991)
Fig. 4: Income and SWB:

United States income and subjective well-being (SWB), 1946—1989. Income is %age of after-tax disposable personal income in 1946 $ (adjusted for inflation). Subjective well-being is reports of happiness as %age values of the 1946 values. (Diener et al p. 288)